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Abstract
Inhibition of prepotent action is an important aspect of self-control, particularly in social contexts. Action inhibition and its
neural bases have been extensively studied. However, the neural precursors of free decisions to inhibit have hardly been
studied. We asked participants to freely choose to either make a rapid key press in response to a visual cue, or to transiently
inhibit action, and briefly delay responding. The task required a behavioural response on each trial, so trials involving
inhibition could be distinguished from those without inhibition as those showing slower reaction times. We used this
criterion to classify free-choice trials as either rapid or inhibited/delayed. For 13 participants, we measured the mean
amplitude of the ERP activity at electrode Cz in three subsequent 50 ms time windows prior to the onset of the signal that
either instructed to respond or inhibit, or gave participants a free choice. In two of these 50 ms time windows (2150 to
2100, and 2100 to 250 ms relative to action onset), the amplitude of prestimulus ERP differed between trials where
participants ’’freely’’ chose whether to inhibit or to respond rapidly. Larger prestimulus ERP amplitudes were associated with
trials in which participants decided to act rapidly as compared to trials in which they decided to delay their responses. Last-
moment decisions to inhibit or delay may depend on unconscious preparatory neural activity.
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Introduction
Decisions for action can be decomposed into at least three
separate functional components [1], associated with the selection
of what action to make (what component); when to make it (when
component) and whether to make it at all. The whether component is
related to last-minute inhibition of an action that has been
prepared and is ready for execution. This component may be
particularly important as a mechanism for self-control [2]. These
different forms of decision (what, when, whether) may be linked to
different underlying neural processes.
Previous studies have linked preparatory activity preceding
voluntary action to decisions about what action to make e.g., [3–
5], or when to make it [6,7]. Both these components of voluntary
decision were shown to have unconscious neural precursors. First,
decisions about when to act can bee associated with the readiness
potential (RP), an accepted marker of neural preparation for
action [6,8]. Libet [9] famously identified RPs already occurring
around 200 ms prior to the conscious decision to move (when
component). Second, Soon et al, [10] found that brain activity
several seconds before conscious decision could predict which
hand people chose to act with (what component). However, the
decision about whether to act has received less attention. Such
whether decisions can be taken at almost any stage during motor
preparation, up until a point of no return [11]. Libet controver-
sially suggested that last-minute decisions to inhibit action involved
a purely conscious form of ‘‘free won’t’’. But theoretical grounds
suggest that conscious decisions to inhibit must depend on
unconscious brain processes, just like decisions to act [12].
However, neural precursors of voluntary inhibition have not yet
been identified experimentally.
We report an experiment in which participants had to either
make a rapid key press action, or transiently inhibit executing the
key press, so as to briefly delay their response. In this way we
operationalized inhibition as a transient process, characterised by
delayed responding, rather than as a complete suppression of all
behavioural output. Our operational definition has the advantage
of matching the action and inhibition conditions more closely,
since both conditions include a motor response – though with
differing latencies. In everyday life, such impulse control by
delaying a voluntary response may help in accumulating further
information about the environment prior to responding [13], or in
synchronising a joint action [14].
We compared neural activity preceding free decisions to act or
briefly inhibit action. In free choice conditions, participants were
not explicitly instructed whether to act rapidly or to delay in any
given trial, but rather chose for themselves. In the absence of any
external cause to act rapidly or inhibit, we hypothesized that some
other factors, such as transient fluctuations in participants’ brain
states, may be relevant to their decision in this case. Therefore, the
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free-choice condition would provide a situation in which putative
internal fluctuations could lead to an overt modification of
behaviour. We also reasoned that external instructions about
action would produce a stronger drive of neural activity,
overriding any intrinsic fluctuations. Consequently, we also
compared neural activity preceding external instructions to act
or to briefly inhibit action. Several recent studies suggest that the
instantaneous state of the brain at the time when a new
information-processing operation begins can play an important
role in how information is processed. For example, the probability
of remembering an item depends on preceding electrical neural
activity [15], and the probability of detecting a visual stimulus
depends on the phase of EEG alpha rhythm over frontocentral
brain regions [16]. By analogy, we hypothesized that ‘free’
decisions to act or inhibit would depend on the progression of
preceding activity in the brain.
The experiment followed a factorial design in which the
differences in neural activity between free decisions to act and free
decisions to inhibit were compared with the differences in neural
activity between instructed decisions to act and instructed
decisions to inhibit. We assumed that sorting trials according to
action or inhibition might reveal patterns of preceding neural
activity that might putatively cause the ‘free’ decision. In
instructed decisions, in contrast, the cause of the decision to act
or inhibit lied in the stimulus, rather than any putative pattern of
preceding neural activity.
We measured electroencephalographic (EEG) activity around
the time of an external instruction to either act quickly or delay
transiently an action, or around the time of a cue that invited
participants to choose to either act quickly or delay transiently.
Although ERP methods do not typically provide high spatial
resolution, they do provide high temporal resolution, [17]. This
makes ERP methods particularly suited for our purposes, as they
allowed us to identify neural activity preceding an instruction that
influenced ’’free’’ decisions in response to the instruction.
Materials and Methods
Fourteen naı¨ve healthy volunteers (9 females, mean 24 years, 12
right-handed) participated in this experiment. Before further data
analysis, one participant was excluded from EEG analyses due to
excessive eye blinking, leaving a total of 13 participants. Each
participant did 8 blocks of 70 trials each, yielding a total of 560
trials.
Each trial fell into one of five possible experimental conditions.
Trials could either be instructed rapid, instructed delayed, free-
choice rapid, free-choice delay, or nogo trials.
Each trial began with a variable fixation cross period (500 to
1200 ms, see fig 1A). A warning sign (a grey circle subtending
1.5u, duration 200 ms) appeared first. The fixation cross
reappeared for 500 ms and was followed by an instruction
cue (a coloured circle, 1.5u visual angle, 200 ms duration). The
instruction cue indicated the trial type. In the instructed rapid
condition (240 trials, 43%), participants were asked to press a
key with their index finger as quickly as possible. In the
instructed delayed condition (80 trials, 14%), participants had to
make the same movement but with the ‘‘shortest possible
delay’’. The exact duration of the delay was not explicitly
specified to the participants, but they were encouraged to delay
their action for a period of time that was ‘‘as short as possible’’.
In the free-choice condition (160 trials, 28%), participants saw a
cue that indicated that they were free to choose which action
outcome to take. Namely, immediately upon the appearance of
the free-choice cue, participants were asked to decide freely
whether to act rapidly or after the shortest possible delay. In
this way, the experiment followed a 262 factorial design, with
the factors source of decision (instructed/free choice) and
outcome (rapid/delayed). In addition, there was a further
additional control condition, the nogo condition, in which
participants were asked to refrain from acting (80 trials, 14%).
The purpose of the nogo condition was to make the task more
demanding and prevent drifts of attention. Data from nogo
trials were not analyzed. The percentages of trials were constant
across all blocks.
The rationale behind the experimental design was as follows.
Neural networks continually exhibit small fluctuations in state,
which may have significant effects on behaviour [18]. These effects
may be particularly relevant for behaviour in the absence of other
clear, strong external signals. We aimed to identify possible effects
of such intrinsic fluctuations on the ‘free’ choice between action
and transient inhibition. We assumed that similar intrinsic
fluctuations should exist before instructed choices to act rapidly
or delay actions. However, the strong signals linked to external
instructions should override these weak internal signals, so that no
differences between activity preceding actions and inhibition
should remain in instructed conditions. Therefore, in a factorial
design we compared neural activity prior to the decision between
rapid or delayed action, where this decision was based either on
internal free choice, or on external instructions. We expected to
find differences in the neural activity preceding free-choice action
decisions, because we hypothesized that preceding neural activity
would strongly influence the decision between different possible
action outcomes. We expected to find no differences in preceding
activity between rapid and delayed action following external
instructions, since the instructional signal should then have a far
stronger influence on behavioural outcome.
In experiments involving freely-chosen inhibition, there is a high
risk of participants deciding in advance not to make an action [19].
In cases of early decisions not to act, no action will be prepared,
and consequently no action inhibition will be necessary. There-
fore, tasks addressing freely-chosen inhibition should encourage
action preparation. In this case, we included a high number of
rapid instructed trials to encourage action preparation, to make
delaying effortful, and to discourage participants from deciding in
advance whether to respond rapidly or inhibit and delay on free-
choice trials. Further, only for trials in the instructed rapid
condition, participants were rewarded (3p) for every key press that
was faster than their average in the previous block. The
experimental design was therefore not strictly balanced, but
emphasized the need for true action inhibition.
In free choice trials, participants were asked to balance their
choices between rapid and delayed responses. The hand used for
responding was fixed for each block, and alternated between
blocks. The correspondence of colours to instructions rotated
across participants, and was additionally reversed for each
participant for the second half of the experiment. Trials within
each participant were randomized, but the proportion of trial
types was valid for each block.
Trials with RTs below 200 ms were rejected, as potentially
anticipatory (1.7661.67%). The average commission error rate in
nogo trials was 1060.9%. These trials were included merely to
engage attention, and to ensure that participants responded only
after receiving the Go signal. Nogo trials were not further
analyzed. RTs for each condition were analyzed in a 262 repeated
measures ANOVA, with the factors decision source (instructed/
free-choice) and response speed (rapid/delay).
To examine whether participants followed any obvious strategy
to produce a balanced outcome between rapid and delayed free-
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choice trials, we evaluated run length in the response sequences in
free-choice trials. Our experiment consisted of 8 blocks, with
20 free-choice trials each. For each block, we excluded the
instructed trials and measured the length of runs (i.e., sequences of
uninterrupted repetitions of the same outcome) for each partic-
ipant. If participants had been producing obvious sequences such
as ‘AABBAABB’ they would produce a single run-length only (in
this case, a run-length of 2). We then generated true random data.
We generated 8 independent ‘‘blocks’’ of 20 ‘‘trials’’ each by
sampling without replacement from a population of 10 quick trials
and 10 delay trials. This restriction of a balance between quick and
delay trials was necessary because our free-choice data was based
on a median split, yielding balanced numbers of trials in the
experimental data.
Ethics Statement
Procedures were approved by the UCL research ethics
committee and were in accordance with the principles of the
Declaration of Helsinki and written informed consent was
obtained from all participants involved in the study.
EEG Data Acquisition and Analysis
A SynAmps amplifier system and Scan 4.3 software (Neuroscan,
El Paso, TX) were used to record EEG data. We recorded activity
from fourteen scalp electrodes (F3, Fz, F4, FC3, FCz, FC4, C3,
Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4, O1, O2) and the right and left mastoids. The
scalp electrodes were placed according to the international 10–20
system. The reference electrode was AFz and the ground electrode
was placed on the chin. All electrode impedances were kept below
5 KV. Electroculograms (EOG) were recorded from bipolar
electrodes placed on the left and right external canthi (to detect
horizontal eye movements), and on the right supra-orbital and
infra-orbital positions (to detect vertical eye movements). EEG
signals were amplified and digitized at 500 Hz.
EEG data were analyzed with EEGLAB software (Delorme and
Makeig, 2004). Data were first re-referenced to the linked
mastoids. Data were digitally band-pass filtered between 0.05 Hz
and 30 Hz. Continuous EEG data was time-locked to the
instruction stimulus, and epochs were defined from 2850 ms to
700 ms after the instruction sign. A baseline period was defined for
each epoch from 2850 to 2700 ms (between 0 and 150 ms prior
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm A. A variable fixation cross period (500–1200 ms) was followed by a brief (200 ms) presentation of a warning
sign. The fixation cross reappeared and 500 ms after the offset of the warning sign, an instruction cue appeared on the screen (200 ms). The
instruction cued participants to press a key either rapidly, or with a short delay, or to freely decide between rapid and delayed pressing. B. Instructed
rapid and delayed trials are separated by their reaction times and free choices. Median split of free-choice trials produces a similar separation. Further,
free choice trials are slower than instructed choice trials, suggesting a free decision process occurring after the cue. * p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053.g001
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to the onset of the warning signal). The hand required for action
was alternated and specified at the beginning of each block.
Lateral (non-midline) electrodes were inverted in the right hand
blocks, as if all data had been collected from the left hand. Because
we inverted the lateral electrodes from the right hand blocks,
electrodes represented in the left hemisphere are now ipsilateral to
action. Similarly, electrodes represented in the right hemisphere
are contralateral to action.
Right-left hand symmetry cannot be assumed in this situation.
First, the left hemisphere is dominant for action preparation [20].
Second, whereas RPs associated with right hand movements are
normally distributed, this is not the case for left hand movements
[21]. The distribution of the early left-hand movement RP
amplitudes shows negative skewness values, even in cases of very
simple actions, such as key presses with the index finger. This
suggests that movements with the non dominant hand may require
more attentional resources and/or special preparatory processes.
To remove blink artifacts, epochs were rejected if the difference
between the two vertical EOG channels was larger than 90 mV.
For ERP data analysis, three consecutive 50 ms time windows
prior to the instruction cue were defined (2150 to 2100 ms,
2100 to 250 ms and 250 to 0 ms). These timepoints were
selected based on previous studies on prestimulus ERP activity
[15]. The mean EEG amplitude in the electrode Cz was calculated
for each participant. As in the case of the RTs, mean window ERP
amplitudes were analyzed in repeated measures ANOVA, using
the statistical packages SPSS for IBM-PC (SPSS Inc.) and custom
Matlab functions (The Matworks, Inc.). Greenhouse-Geiser (GG)
corrections were applied when appropriate, but full degrees of
freedom are reported.
Our experimental design included a much larger number of
trials in the instructed rapid condition than in the other three
conditions. We therefore used resampling methods to control for
uneven numbers of trials [22]. For each participant, the number of
trials in the instructed delay condition was found. The same
number of trials was then randomly sampled, with replacement,
from the trials in the instructed rapid condition. These two
populations of trials were then combined to get an overall
distribution of instructed RTs. A trial was considered as correct in
the instructed rapid condition if its RT was quicker than the
median of the distribution of instructed RTs. In the same way, a
trial was considered as correct in the instructed delayed condition
if its RT was slower than the median of the distribution of
instructed RTs. Finally, the mean CNV amplitude measured from
electrode Cz was obtained for all four main trial types, in each of
the 50 ms time windows prior to the instruction, and averaged
across subjects. This procedure was repeated 10,000 times.
Results
Behavioural Results
Following the monetary reward incentive to the instructed rapid
trials, participants became quicker in each block. The total
number of rewarded trials (i.e., those instructed rapid trials that
were quicker than the average of the previous block) was 156610
(mean 6 SD), and there was a mean decrease in RT of 55 ms.
Instructed trials were classified as rapid or delayed a priori,
according to the instruction given in each trial. Free-choice trials
lacked a specific instruction, and hence were classified as rapid or
delayed a posteriori, on the basis of a median split of each
participant’s free-choice response RT distribution (figure 1B, see
below for sensitivity analysis). ‘Because the free choice trials were
classified as rapid or delayed (i.e., median split), exactly half of the
trials were rapid, and half of the trials were delayed.
To determine the effect of the decision in the free-choice
conditions, we performed a 262 ANOVA on the RTs with the
factors decision source (instructed/free-choice) and response
outcome (rapid/delay). The main effect of source of decision
(F1,13 = 7.15; p = 0.019) arose because free-choice responses were
slower than instructed responses. This suggests that the free
decision to respond rapidly or to transiently inhibit and delay
involved a time-consuming cognitive process occurring after the
instruction signal. The main effect of outcome (F1,13 = 81.43;
p,0.001) unsurprisingly showed that participants significantly
delayed their RTs both in instructed and in free-choice conditions.
There was no significant interaction between source of decision
and outcome (F1,13 = 0.12; p = 0.734).
Control behavioural analyses were performed on the data from
the 13 participants considered in the EEG measurements.
Participants switched hands in each block. Therefore there could
have been an effect of hand used. To examine this possibility we
compared the RTs for blocks in which participants used their
dominant vs. nondominant hand. We conducted a repeated
measures three-way ANOVA, with the factors block subset
(dominant hand/nondominant hand blocks), source (instructed/
free-choice) and outcome (rapid/delayed). We found a main effect
of block subset (F1,12 = 6.40, p = 0.026), indicating that participants
were quicker to make actions with their dominant hands, as might
be expected. However, there was no significant three-way
interaction (F1,12 = 0.08 p = 0.770), indicating that the hand used
did not affect the interaction of source x outcome that is of interest
here.
Similarly, to rule out low-level effect of the physical stimuli, the
correspondence between S2 colour and instruction was changed
half way through the experiment. This could have led to a
significant Stoop-like effect [23]. To explore this possibility, we
again conducted a repeated measures three-way ANOVA, with
the factors block subset (first half/second half), source (instructed/
free-choice) and outcome (rapid/delayed). We found a main effect
of block subset (F1,12 = 18.38, p = 0.01), suggesting that partici-
pants had learnt the association in the first half of the experiment,
and the switch in association between colour of the instruction cue
and the task generated a Stroop-like effect. Importantly however,
as in the case of hand used we found no significant three-way
interaction (F1,12 = 0.47, p = 0.505), suggesting that the source x
outcome interaction was not modulated by Stroop-like effects.
Participants’ Strategies
We asked participants to produce roughly 50% rapid and 50%
delay responses. This may have led to stereotyped behaviour, such
as chunking or direct alternating strategies. If this had been the
case, the decision to act rapidly or delay would not have been
taken just before the instruction, but presumably at the onset of the
trial. To discourage this strategy, we interleaved instructed and
free-choice trials. The alternation between free rapid and delayed
trials would therefore require a higher effort of maintenance of the
preceding history of choices in working memory. We did formal
tests to rule out potential chunking behaviour (e.g., patterns of
responses such as AABBAABB). We examined the run length in
each participants’ sequence of free-choice responses, and com-
pared it with simulated random data (see figure S1 in Supporting
information S1). The simulated data shows the same pattern than
the experimental data. To test if this was indeed the case, we did a
264 ANOVA with the factors data type (experimental/simulation)
and run length (1 to 4). We found a main effect of data type
(F1,13 = 6.98, p = 0.02) and a significant data type x run length
interaction (F2,26 = 4.19, p = 0.019). We therefore did independent
paired t-tests for the number of runs of length 1,2,3 and 4. We
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found that only the number of run lengths of 1 differed
significantly between the experimental and the simulated data
(experimental data mean 6 SD: 4066 runs; simulated data:
4666 runs; t13 =22.981, p = 0.010). Participants showed fewer
runs of length 1 than expected based on simulation results,
indicating that subjects tended to avoid direct alternation.
Finally, to statistically test for randomness of responses we
collapsed all blocks of each subject into a single run of 160 trials,
we performed a Wald-Wolfowitz Runs test [24] for each subject.
The null hypothesis that the sequence generated was random was
not rejected for any participant (all p.0.135).
ERP Results
After artefact rejection, an average of 164670 trials (69% of
original trials) remained for the instructed rapid condition, 67612
(84%) trials for the instructed delayed condition, 57622 (72%)
trials for the free-choice rapid condition and 6969 (86%) trials for
the free-choice delayed condition. Participants were told that they
could blink only after having made an action, to prevent the well-
known tendency to blink and press the key at the same time. This
instruction could explain the observed differences in the propor-
tion of rejected trials between action and transient inhibition
conditions Earlier key presses in the rapid conditions might have
been the cause of more blinks occurring during the epoch of
interest.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) showed a clear negativity before
the instruction signal (Figure 2). This corresponds to the classical
contingent negative variation (CNV), [25,26].
To examine the topography of this component, we produced
scalp maps in the three time windows of interest. These maps show
that the CNV shows a broad distribution, centred on electrode Cz
(see figure 3).
To explore differences in the CNV amplitude between
conditions, we first explored the topography of the CNV potential.
We conducted a 26263 ANOVA, with the factors source
(instructed/free choice), outcome (rapid/delay) and electrode
group (ipsilateral/midline/contralateral). Segmenting electrodes
into regions rather than entering them individually as factors into
an ANOVA is a more informative approach [17]. We excluded
the parietal and occipital electrodes, given the a priori hypothesis
of the known topographical distribution of the CNV [25,26]. To
simplify the analyses, we chose the single time window of 2150 to
0 ms prior to the instruction cue.
We found a main effect of electrode group (F2,24 = 8.59,
p = 0.002), no main effect of source (F1,12 = 0.03, p = 0.874) and
no main effect of outcome (F1,12 = 0.95, p = 0.348). We found a
marginally significant source x outcome interaction effect
(F1,12 = 4.55, p = 0.054). This effect did not interact with electrode
group (F2,24 = 0.24, p = 0.673). We therefore took the standard
approach of using the electrode Cz for the analysis of the CNV
amplitude.
We next explored whether there were any differences between
conditions over the three time windows defined for analysis. We
used a 26263 ANOVA with the factors source, outcome and time
bin (2150 to 2100 ms/2100 to 250 ms/250 to 0 ms). We
found a main effect of time window (F2,24 = 8.77, p = 0.007); no
main effect of source (F1,12 = 0.03, p = 0.862) and no main effect of
outcome (F1,12 = 1.16, p = 0.302). There was a significant interac-
tion effect between source and outcome (F1,12 = 6.06, p = 0.030).
This interaction was explored by post-hoc testing. In the free
choice condition, the CNV amplitude measured from Cz was
reduced (i.e., less negative) when participants chose to transiently
inhibit and delay than when they chose to respond rapidly. In
contrast, the instructed condition showed no difference between
rapid and delay trials. That is, CNV amplitude just before the
decision cue had a specific association with subsequent free choices
to respond rapidly or to delay. Figure 4 shows the topographical
distribution of these differences.
This two-way interaction in turn shows a marginally significant
interaction with time window, as shown by the three-way
interaction in ANOVA, F2,24 = 3.8, p = 0.051). Because of this
marginal three-way interaction, we evaluated the source x
outcome interaction effect in each one of the three time windows
(2150 to 2100 ms, 2100 to 250 ms and 250 to 0 ms). We
found the source x outcome interaction in the 2150 to 2100 ms
(p = 0.041) and 2100 to 250 ms window (p = 0.016), but not the
250 to 0 ms window (p = 0.110) (see table 1). Because post-hoc t-
tests were examined only to explore significant interactions,
corrections for multiple comparisons were not used.
We classified rapid and delayed trials a priori in the instructed
condition, but a posteriori in the inhibit/delayed condition. We thus
assumed that instructed rapid and instructed delayed trials were
drawn from separate populations, with different mean RTs.
However, if participants had completely failed to follow the
instruction to respond rapidly, or with a delay, then instructed
Figure 2. ERPs time locked to the instruction cue A. Averaged
CNV amplitude in electrode Cz for the four main conditions, time locked
to the appearance of the instruction cue (time 0 corresponds to the
onset of the instruction cue). Note the difference in CNV amplitude
between two free-choice rapid and delayed trials (solid lines), but no
difference in CNV amplitude between instructed choice rapid and
delayed trials (dashed lines). Asterisks indicate a significant ANOVA
interaction (F test, p,0.05, uncorrected). Vertical dashed line at
2700 ms indicates onset of warning signal and the end of baseline
period (2850 to 2700 ms). B. mean CNV amplitudes for the time
window between 2150 and 0 ms electrode Cz. Asterisk shows a
significant difference (t-test, p,0.05, two tails, uncorrected).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053.g002
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rapid and instructed delay RTs would not have differed. In the
CNV, RT and ERP amplitude have been shown to be inversely
related [27]. The interaction we found between instructed and
free-choice conditions could then be an artifact of using a priori
classification criteria for instructed conditions, but a posteriori
classification criteria for free-choice conditions.
We suggest this is not the case, for several reasons. First, a strong
main effect of outcome emerged when instructed trials were
classified a priori according to the instruction signal, suggesting that
participants indeed attended to the instruction to respond rapidly
or to delay, and indeed generated two distinct populations of
instructed trials with minimal overlap in RT. Crucially, we found
Figure 3. Topographical plot of ERP amplitude before the instruction cue. Topographical distribution of the CNV component for each of
the four main conditions, averaged over three time windows selected for analysis. White highlight shows electrode Cz, from which the mean time
window amplitudes were obtained for statistical analyses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053.g003
Figure 4. Differential topographical plots of ERPs. Topographical plots of the difference in brain activity between rapid and delayed trials.
Depicted values are averaged amplitudes over 50 ms time windows. Note stronger difference in free-choice than in instructed conditions. White
highlight shows electrode Cz, from which the mean time window amplitudes were obtained for statistical analyses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053.g004
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no significant interaction (p = 0.73) between decision outcome and
decision source. This was also the case when we controlled for
hand used or possible confusion due to Stroop-like effects. These
findings suggest that participants were equally able to produce
distinct rapid and delayed actions in instructed and free-choice
conditions. Thus, our a priori criterion for instructed trials and a
posteriori criterion for free-choice trials were approximately
matched. Since treatment of RTs was successfully matched across
instructed and free-choice conditions, differences between ERP
amplitudes cannot simply be a consequence of differences in RT
distributions.
Second, we performed an additional analysis in which
instructed trials and delayed trials were both classified in the same
way, using an a posteriori criterion, based on RT. Our experimental
design deliberately over-emphasised the number of instructed
rapid trials. To account for possible overestimation of differences
due to an a posteriori criterion, we used subsampling methods (See
Methods section). Results of this subsampling procedure are shown
in figure 5.
If participants had ignored the instruction signal, the mean
proportion of correct instructed trials should have been around
50% in both conditions. Instead, the mean proportion of correct
trials was 87.169% in the rapid condition; and 87.268% in the
delay condition. This suggests that the a priori classification yielded
similar populations than the a posteriori classification.
In the case of free-choice conditions, the resampled data formed
two clearly distinct populations. One population of resampled
trials presented slower, above-median RTs and was therefore
classified as delayed/inhibited. These trials were associated with
lower prestimulus CNV amplitudes. A second population
presented faster, below-median RTs. These trials were thus
classified as rapid responses and were associated with higher
prestimulus CNV amplitudes. The 95% confidence intervals for
the two resampled populations did not overlap, replicating the
finding of our main analysis. Prestimulus CNV amplitude differed
before a free choice to respond rapidly or with a delay. In the
instructed conditions, the resampled data did not form two clearly
distinct populations and the 95% confidence intervals for
prestimulus CNV amplitude show clear overlap between slower,
above-median RTs classified as delayed/inhibited, and faster
below-median RTs classified as rapid. The same resampling
procedure was repeated for all three time windows (see supple-
mentary material, figure S2 and table S1 in Supporting
information S1).
Lastly, we analyzed the RT distribution for each participant (see
supplemental figures S3 to S16 in Supporting information S2 file
for individual distributions). Could the strong difference in the
CNV amplitudes between the free-choice conditions be a simple
consequence of a strong separation between quick and delayed
RTs? If this were the case, then RT distributions in the free
conditions should be more bimodal than instructed conditions. We
used an established coefficient of bimodality b appropriate for
large trial numbers [28]:
b~(s2z1)=(kz3)
Where s and k are indexes of skewness and kurtosis respectively.
The index of bimodality was in fact lower in the free-choice than
in the instructed condition (the instructed conditions showed a
higher coefficient of bimodality than free-choice conditions, mean
6 SD 0.4460.07 and 0.2260.05, respectively). These measures of
bimodality were significantly different (t13 = 9.7, p,0.01). The
difference remained significant when data was subsampled using
the same procedures as the one described for the CNV amplitudes.
This provides further evidence against the possibility that CNV
amplitude differences in the free-choice conditions simply reflect
stronger RT differences for free than instructed choices.
Discussion
In this experiment participants were instructed either to press
rapidly or to inhibit and delay a key press; or they were free to
choose between these two alternatives. Our results show that the
neural activity before the moment of decision to inhibit differed
from that before a decision to act rapidly. When participants chose
to respond rapidly on free-choice trials, they did so on the basis of
stronger preparatory activity before the moment of choice.
Choosing to transiently inhibit and delay responding was
associated with lower preparatory activity. This prestimulus
influence on decision was unique to free-choice trials, and was
absent or reduced when participants were instructed to inhibit/
delay. By definition, in the instructed condition, participants’
behaviour was dictated by the instruction cue. Therefore the
prestimulus CNV activity cannot predict instructed behaviour.
Consequently we used the instructed condition as a negative
control, and sought to find differences in the prestimulus CNV
trace between the two free-choice conditions.
Because different criteria were used to classify rapid and delayed
trials for instructed and free-choice trials, we performed additional
analyses in which instructed trials were also classified according to
their RTs. The pattern of results remained the same. Therefore, a
specific prestimulus CNV amplitude difference between rapid and
delayed actions was still present for free-choice trials, but not for
instructed-choice trials, even when the number of trials was
balanced across conditions, and classification criteria were chosen
to distinguish rapid and delayed responses in a similar way for
free-choice and instructed decisions.
Could our result have occurred because of variations in general
arousal level? Specifically, a participant who was mindwandering
or not engaged in the task might be expected to show low CNV
amplitudes and long RTs [25]. Conversely, a high preceding level
of arousal and engagement would be likely to produce a short RT.
Thus, on a free-choice trial, a prior state of high arousal would be
likely classified as a decision to respond rapidly, even if no specific
cognitive process of decision actually occurred. Similarly a low
preceding level of arousal would be likely to be classified as a
decision to transiently inhibit responding. On this view, the
relations between prior CNV activity and RT that we identified as
decisions to act or inhibit might in fact be due to general arousal
effects, rather than effects of prior neural activity on a specific
cognitive decision process. However, the variation in RT in our
Table 1. Results of statistical analyses of ERP amplitudes in
three 50 ms time bins.
Interaction Free-choice Instructed
Time interval
(ms) F1,12 p t12 p t12 p
2150 to 250 5.18 0.041 21.79 0.097 0.58 0.56
2100 to 250 7.75 0.016 22.57 0.024 0.66 0.515
250 to 0 2.96 0.110 20.80 0.437 1.05 0.313
The table shows the interaction term of a 262 ANOVA (source of decision x
outcome), and results of the follow-up t-tests. All p values are uncorrected. See
text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053.t001
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data was much larger than that expected due to arousal effects
alone. For example, Cheyne [29] have described the ‘‘natural’’
fluctuations in RT in a go/nogo task [30]. Their results show, for
example, that trials preceding commission errors were on average
20 ms quicker than other trials. Conversely, trials preceding
omission errors were on average 150 ms slower than the baseline.
In our experiment, the differences between rapid and delayed
trials were of around 600 ms, much longer than delays explained
by occasional inattention or ‘‘zoning out’’ episodes. We argue that
our RT differences reflected outcomes of a specific decision
process, and that this specific process was driven by neural
precursor activity. This precursor activity may well have been in
turn related to arousal, but our effects were clearly mediated by a
specific action/inhibition decision process. This decision process
occurred either based on external instruction, or on participants’
‘‘free’’ decisions. We show that these free decisions to inhibit/delay
in fact depended on preceding brain activity, before the instruction
to decide. The current state of the brain appears to influence the
conscious decision to act or inhibit/delay, rather than vice versa.
Could our participants actually have decided to inhibit/delay
before the visual signal to choose? Two facts argue strongly against
this potential predecision. First, we included frequent and rapid-
response trials in the instructed condition to discourage such early
predecision, and rewarded participants according to their RTs on
these trials. Second, a 262 ANOVA revealed a main effect of
source of decision, with free-choice trials being 90 ms slower than
instructed trials (p = 0.019), consistent with a time-consuming
decision stage occurring after the instruction, and comparable to
RT costs of instructed choices (Hick, 1952).
Finally, to discourage stereotyped behaviour in the free-choice
trials (such as direct alternation between action outcomes), we
interleaved instructed and free-choice trials. In this way, a
predecided strategy to maintain a stereotyped behaviour would
have required higher working memory load. To check whether
such predecided strategies were followed, we examined the
distribution of the length of runs (i.e., sequences of repeated
action outcomes) for each participant. A distribution of runs
strongly centred around a given number would have indicated a
predecided strategy, No single participant showed evidence for a
stereotyped behaviour.
These data suggest that free choices to inhibit/delay were made
after the visual cue, but were strongly driven by antecedent,
unconscious brain activity.
Limitations of This Study
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the
results of this study. Our sample size is relatively low, and our
inferences should therefore be taken with caution. Nevertheless,
the size of our study is comparable with other recent studies on
prestimulus EEG activity [31–33].
In terms of design and data analysis, five important limitations
should be taken into consideration. First, our factorial design was
not perfectly balanced, as it included a relatively higher number of
instructed quick trials as compared to instructed delayed trials.
Figure 5. Control to account for differential trial numbers between conditions. Bootstrapping procedure to resample instructed trials,
compensating for differences in numbers of each trial type. This procedure allows instructed and free-choice reactions to be classified based on
reaction times. Results are shown for the interval of 2150 to 0 ms prior to the onset of the visual cue, in electrode Cz A. The instructed rapid and
delayed subsampled populations cannot be easily distinguished. In contrast, the free-choice rapid and delayed subsample populations are clearly
distinct. B. 95% Confidence intervals for instructed and free-choice conditions. Note that while they are separate in the free choice conditions, they
overlap in the instructed conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053053.g005
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Participants were rewarded on the basis of these rapid instructed
trials only. At the end of each block they received a reward
proportional to the number of rapid instructed trials that were
faster than the average on the preceding block. Because only
instructed rapid trials were rewarded, the free and instructed
conditions could have differed in terms of motivation. These
differences in motivation may have influenced the way in which
movements have been prepared or delayed. This imbalance in
both trial numbers and reward was the result of a strategic decision
to try to discourage participants from predeciding before each trial
whether to act or delay. By using the rewards on instructed trials to
motivate advance preparation of actions, we could assume with
greater confidence that delayed responses involved an inhibition of
an already-prepared action.
Second, we classified free-choice trials as rapid or delayed
actions based on their reaction times. This approach has the
advantage of not relying on subjective report, but only on objective
behavioural measures. However, these objective measures may not
provide a perfect classification. Long RTs may be indicative of
action inhibition, but may also arise for other reasons than
inhibition, such as failures of attention, long decision times, etc.
However, if our classification approach were simply imperfect, this
would count against the probability of finding significant
differences between trial types.
Arousal is one particular factor that might influence RT by
affecting preparation. However, a general relation between arousal
and RT would be presumably common to both instructed and
free-choice conditions. To explore the particular possibility of a
role of arousal, we conducted the resampling analysis splitting the
instructed data into rapid and delayed based on the median RT.
In this way, had arousal been the only factor influencing the CNV
amplitudes, then the instructed conditions would have shown two
different populations in our resampling analysis. This was not the
case. Instead, we found a specific relation between preparatory
activity and a free decision to delay, with no such relation in
instructed choice conditions. This can not be explained by a
general relation between arousal and RT without additional ad hoc
assumptions.
A third limitation of our study comes from the low spatial
resolution of ERP [17]. In particular, the differences in CNV
amplitude that we found prior to rapid vs. delayed free-choice
responses may have a subcortical source [34] that cannot be
measured at the scalp.
Fourth, our analysis may miss out some hemisphere-specific
variations in preceding neural activity. We asked participants to
switch hands in every block, and then collapsed the ERPs obtained
for the hemisphere contralateral and ipsilateral to the movement,
regardless of the hand actually used for movement. However, the
distribution of RPs in left and right hemisphere is known to differ
(e.g., [35]). Dirnberger et al [21] have shown that there are
‘‘atypical’’ trials in left hand key press tasks (but not in right hand
key press tasks). These trials were found to have exceptionally early
pre-movement activity. Such atypical trials lead to RP amplitude
distributions that violate the assumption of a Gaussian distribution,
necessary for the parametric analyses used here. Because we
collapsed trials made with the right and left hand, it is not clear
whether such atypical trials are present here, and how valid the
assumptions of normality are. However, our design focussed on
differences between free-choice and instructed conditions, with
equal numbers of right and left hand movements in each
condition. To our knowledge, any bias introduced by hemispheric
asymmetry should be equivalent in free-choice and instructed
conditions, and would therefore not influence our conclusions.
Nevertheless, further control experiments could check for potential
right-left asymmetries.
Finally, as is common practice in paradigms involving free
choices, we asked participants to try to balance their choices, and
roughly choose to act rapidly in 50% of the free-choice trials. This
requisite for a roughly balanced behaviour may have encouraged
participants to predecide in advance the sequence of free action
outcomes they would choose. We formally tested this possibility
and found no evidence for non-random behaviour, but the
possibility cannot be fully discarded.
Implications of This Study
Free decisions about what action to make have been shown to be
affected by subliminal primes [36]. In the same way, subliminal
primes have been shown to modulate ERP components typically
associated with inhibition in a go/nogo task [37]. Here we did not
present subliminal primes to alter the preceding neural activity,
but instead capitalized on the intrinsic variation in brain activity
preceding the Instruction to decide. We argue that participants
‘‘freely decided’’ to respond quickly or delay their responses,
depending on the degree of preparation within the cortical motor
system immediately preceding the instruction to decide. Our data
can be parsimoniously explained by the suggestion that ’’conscious
free decisions’’ to inhibit action may depend on the preceding state
of the brain. Interestingly, the classic definition of voluntary
actions involves contrasting them with instructed, stimulus-driven
actions [38]. Volition thus amounts to ‘‘not externally generated’’
action. Our cortical excitability measures would presumably satisfy
this definition, since they correspond to fluctuations of internal
signals. Links between free will and other internal neural signals
have been proposed, notably the default mode network [39].
Antecedent brain activity was shown to precede subsequent
conscious decisions about when to act (by about 700 ms -Libet
et al, 1983-), or to be predictive of what action to make (by several
seconds -Soon et al, 2008-). EEG activity was also reported to
precede ‘‘free decisions’’ to inhibit [40]. However, these results
depend on interpreting subjective reports about time of free
decisions, which remain controversial [41]. Moreover, the
experimental designs of those studies did not take the steps we
have taken to exclude advance pre-decision about whether to
action or not. Our task was designed to constrain the decision to
act or delay/inhibit to an identifiable point in time. This makes the
finding of antecedent neural prediction of ‘‘free’’ decisions more
striking, and may provide more convincing evidence for a form of
neural determinism. In particular, our results show that antecedent
brain activity influences ‘‘free choices’’. This is true even when the
decision process is precisely defined in time, and when data
analysis is based on objective behavioural criteria, rather than on
subjective reports.
Importantly, our results also illustrate that unconscious brain
activity significantly influences behaviour in situations where
participants internally generate for themselves how to respond, yet
there is no strong motivation to choose any one possible response
alternative over the other. Preceding brain activity may have
much less influence on behaviour when a clear instruction or
strong internal motivation (such as a financial incentive) encour-
ages choosing one response alternative over the other. In that case,
any influence of preceding brain activity will be diluted or
overridden to produce the ‘‘correct’’ response. On the other hand,
cases of decision without clear instruction or strong internal
motivation are particularly important, because they are the focus
of debates about ‘‘endogenous’’ decisions, and more generally
about ‘‘free will’’.
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Our main argument is as follows: Libet et al, (1983) had
suggested that decisions to inhibit action have an important role in
freedom of will, because, he argued, they do not have any obvious
unconscious neural precursors. In Libet’s view, this makes
decisions to inhibit crucially different from decisions to act, for
which, he claimed, there is a clear unconscious precursor. Libet’s
dualistic notion of ‘‘free won’t’’ has been criticised on theoretical
grounds. However, in our view, a stronger rejection of ‘‘free
won’t’’ could come from actually showing that a decision to act or
not can be driven by a preceding, presumably unconscious neural
activity. Our results identify, for the first time, a candidate
unconscious precursor of the decision to inhibit action. These
results count as evidence against Libet’s view that the decision to
inhibit action may involve a form of uncaused conscious causation.
Conclusion
Neuroscience cannot straightforwardly accommodate a concept
of ‘‘conscious free will’’, independent of brain activity [42].
However, the belief that humans have free will is fundamental to
human society [43]. This belief has profound top-down effects on
cognition [44] and even on brain activity itself [45]. The dualistic
view that decisions to inhibit reflect a special ‘‘conscious veto’’ or
‘‘free won’t’’ mechanism [46] is scientifically unwarranted.
Instead, conscious decisions to check and delay our actions may
themselves be consequences of specific brain mechanisms linked to
action preparation and action monitoring [19]. Recent neurosci-
entific studies have strongly questioned the concept of free will, but
have had difficulty addressing the alternative concept of free won’t,
largely because of the absence of behavioural markers of
inhibition. Our results suggest that an important aspect of ‘‘free’’
decisions to inhibit can be explained without recourse to an
endogenous, ’’uncaused’’ process: the cause of our ‘‘free decisions’’
may at least in part, be simply the background stochastic
fluctuations of cortical excitability. Our results suggest that free
won’t may be no more free than free will.
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